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Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, and Incumbent Success in 
Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Chechnya  
 
Abstract This article fills the gap in existing scholarship on asymmetric 
conflict, indigenous forces, and how socio-cultural codes shape the dynamics 
and outcomes of conflict transformation. Specifically, it identifies three key 
socio-cultural values commonplace in honorific societies: retaliation, 
hospitality, and silence. As sources of effective pro-insurgent violent 
mobilisation and support from among the local population, these values 
provide insurgents with an asymmetric advantage over much stronger 
incumbents. Using the case studies of the two Russian counterinsurgencies in 
Chechnya, the article shows the mechanisms on the ground through which 
Moscow’s deployment of indigenous forces against insurgents helped to stem 
the tide of conflict, reversing the insurgents’ initial advantage in terms of 
asymmetry of values.  
 
Keywords: asymmetry of values, asymmetric conflict, indigenous forces, 
counterinsurgency, Chechnya, North Caucasus  
 
Introduction  
Throughout history, indigenous forces (IF) have frequently been deployed by the 
incumbent powers to assist in fighting insurgencies. Over the past thirty years, a large and 
rapidly growing literature on IF in counterinsurgencies (COIN) has sought to demonstrate 
  
that the use of IF contributes to the incumbent’s success in local conflicts. Studies on the 
deployment of native units in COIN operations in Vietnam, Malaya, Afghanistan, and 
many other parts of the world have shown that well-trained, effectively organised, and 
highly motivated IF provide significant support to incumbents.1 IF provide the 
counterinsurgency with crucial insider information about the insurgents and their 
supporters, and foster a vital social base among the local population.2 IF not only help the 
incumbent to increase its numbers, but also to legitimise its efforts in the eyes of the local 
populace and beyond.3 
While many have studied the importance of deploying IF in COIN, little is known 
about the particular mechanisms allowing IF to contribute to a successful COIN. For 
example, it is still unclear as to how, and under what conditions, the deployment of IF 
contributes to a stronger incumbent’s victory over a weaker insurgent. Existing literature 
identifies the following key factors contributing to the successful deployment of IF in 
COIN: military training; combat experience; an ideological or material motivational base; 
                                                 
1 Robert M. Cassidy, ‘Regular and Irregular Indigenous Forces for a Long Irregular War’, 
The RUSI Journal, 152 /1 (2007) 42-47; James S. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in 
Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute 2006). 
2  Corum, Training Indigenous Forces; Robert M. Cassidy, ‘The Long Small War: 
Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency’, Parameters (2006) 47-62; Yoav Gortzak, ‘Using 
Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: The French in Algeria, 1954-1962‘, Journal 
of Strategic Studies, 32/2 (2009) 307-333. 
3  Cassidy, The Long Small War, 47-48. 
  
strong command and control; and the incumbent’s understanding of local social 
microcosms.4  
This article complements the existing literature by arguing that, in addition to the 
aforementioned factors responsible for the effectiveness of IF, specific socio-cultural 
values form a unique set of mechanisms. These socio-cultural codes create an asymmetry 
of values between insurgents and the incumbent in favour of the former, providing them 
with mechanisms of violent mobilisation and support structures to undermine this value-
based imbalance. Although extensive research has been conducted on political, 
economic, and ideological motivations of insurgent combatants, researchers have not 
addressed the effects of socio-cultural values on conflict dynamics and outcomes in great 
detail. In addition to economic, political, and other ideological considerations, it is their 
reliance on these value systems that enables insurgents to succeed in defeating their 
adversaries’ will to continue fighting.  
This article argues that the use of IF helps the incumbent to balance the 
asymmetry of values in its favour, shaping conflict transformation and affecting its 
outcome. Using the examples of two successive Russian counterinsurgency campaigns in 
Chechnya, this article demonstrates that: (1) retaliation, as well as the codes of silence 
and hospitality, provide both a robust impetus for violent mobilisation and serve as 
insurgent support structures, and that (2) IF are able to transform a conflict’s dynamics by 
offsetting the asymmetry of values previously existing among the belligerents in favour 
of the incumbent. This article thus answers the questions: Does the deployment of IF 
                                                 
4  Gortzak, Using Indigenous Forces, 329-331. 
  
affect the imbalance of socio-cultural codes? How and under what conditions does the 
use of IF contribute to the incumbent’s success in an asymmetric conflict?  
This research follows a case study design based on an in-depth comparative 
analysis of both primary qualitative interview data and secondary sources. The bulk of 
primary interview data utilised in this article was collected during a series of 32 face-to-
face interviews conducted in major European cities with two categories of informants. 
First, in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with former and current 
members of Chechen insurgent groups. Due to security concerns, this category of 
participants was interviewed under the condition of strict confidentiality. The second 
category of interviewees includes experts, scholars, and practitioners with relevant work 
or research experience.  
 
Theoretical framework: Asymmetric conflicts 
While disparity in numbers, weapons, military strategy, and ideology has existed 
throughout human history, it is only after the start of the Cold War, and more recently 
with the development of ‘new wars’ fought between regular armies and insurgents, that 
the concept of asymmetric warfare has been firmly established in literature on conflict 
studies.5 With the increase in the number of ‘new wars’ and the decreasing occurrence of 
‘old wars’, i.e. armed conflicts between nation-states, the issue of asymmetry has become 
                                                 
5  Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: 
Polity Press 2006). 
  
increasingly important both in academic research and expert reports.6 The majority of 
research on asymmetric conflicts has continuously prioritised the significance of military 
strength, i.e. technology, training, and preparedness – the typical determinants of military 
success in classic theories of warfare.7  
After the U.S. military’s failure in the Vietnam War and following the Soviet 
debacle in Afghanistan, studies on asymmetric conflicts started to emphasise the 
importance of military strategy.8 As argued by Cassidy,9 unlike incumbents who faced no 
direct threat to their existence in fighting insurgencies, for insurgents, the struggle could 
only mean ‘victory or death.’10 To effectively confront an insurgent force skilled in 
unconventional warfare, a modern army thus had to re-think its strategy and adapt to a 
completely different type of combatant – guerrilla fighters. Regardless of the importance 
of strategic adaptation in modern asymmetric conflicts, it has become readily apparent 
that a ‘weaker’ side may overcome its stronger opponents due not only to their reliance 
on guerrilla tactics, but also to their motivation and will to succeed.  
                                                 
6 T.V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1994); Colin S. Gray, ‘Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of 
Terror’, Parameters (Spring 2002) 5-14. 
7  Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts.  
8  Cassidy, Regular and Irregular, 42-43. 
9  Robert M. Cassidy, ‘Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly’, Military Review 10-11 
(2000) 41-53. 
10  Ibid. 44. 
  
This has led to the expansion of the literature on motivational asymmetry. 
Pioneered by Mack,11 who noted that it is only possible for insurgents to win if they 
succeed in breaking their adversaries’ will to continue fighting, the literature on 
motivational asymmetry has focused on the incentives and will of the warring sides. 
Although most of the early interpretations of asymmetric conflicts have focused almost 
entirely on military and economic aspects of the warring sides, motivational asymmetry 
began to attract more followers by the end of the Cold War.12 For example, 
Fischerkeller13 introduced the concept of cultural asymmetry – an attempt to distinguish 
adversaries on the basis of their military culture. Unlike Fischerkeller, who sought 
primarily to emphasise political aspects of motivational asymmetry in conflicts among 
nation-states, more recent studies have focused on motivational asymmetry of combatants 
in COIN operations and other forms of irregular armed conflicts.14 Among these, studies 
by Gross, Winter and van Baarda, and Verweij discuss non-material types of asymmetry 
from a variety of perspectives.15 Merom’s16 research on  motivational asymmetry and the 
                                                 
11  Andrew Mack, ‘Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric 
Conflict’, World Politics 27/1 (1975). 
12 The interest in motivational asymmetry began to increase following the Vietnam War. 
13  Michael P. Fischerkeller, ‘David versus Goliath: Cultural judgments in asymmetric 
wars’, Security Studies 7/4 (1998) 1-43. 
14  Robert M. Cassidy, Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and 
the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict (Strategic Studies Institute 1993).  
15  Michael L. Gross, Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination and 
Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict (NY: Cambridge University Press 2010); Yves 
Winter, ‘The Asymmetric War Discourse and its Moral Economies: A Critique’, International 
  
‘balance of will’ is far more comprehensive; echoing Mack’s assumptions and arguing 
that if a failure to achieve victory usually results in an incumbent’s physical withdrawal 
from a conflict zone and re-definition of its foreign policy, defeat leads to an 
‘underdog’s’ complete annihilation. Accordingly, patriotism, nationalism, or the simple 
desires to protect one’s home, household, or lifestyle are often combined with material 
incentives, political ideology, and religious beliefs. Most of these motivations fall into the 
category of ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’17 causes of individual violent mobilisation. 
Nevertheless, as proven by Merom, motivational and will-centred aspects of violent 
mobilisation do not always offer a comprehensive explanation as to why incumbents lose 
‘small wars.’ As a matter of fact, asymmetry of motivations and will is a fairly unstable 
variable that tends to fluctuate under the influence of numerous determinants. For 
instance, regardless of the religious, political, and patriotic motivations of Pashtun 
fighters supporting the Taliban on the eve of the allied invasion in 2001, numerous 
Pashtun tribes soon switched sides and joined a stronger Northern Alliance-led force.18 
Similarly, the political motivations of Colombia’s FARC guerrillas have failed to prevent 
                                                                                                                                                 
Theory 3/3 (2011) 488-514; Th.A. van Baarda and D.E.M. Verweij (eds.) The Moral Dimension 
of Asymmetrical Warfare. Counter-terrorism, Democratic Values and Military Ethics (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhof 2009).  
16  Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars. State, Society and the Failures of 
France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2003). 
17  Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond 
Greed and Grievance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2003). 
18 John Alexander, ‘“Decomposing” an Insurgency’, The RUSI Journal 157/4 (2012) 48-54.   
  
continuous mass de-mobilisation and the surrender of rebel fighters.19 As most of the 
research on non-material forms of asymmetry focuses on ideational and motivational 
dimensions of asymmetric relations, little is known about socio-cultural forms of 
asymmetry.    
 
Introducing the asymmetry of values 
In order to explain the crucial role of IF in COIN, it is important to understand which 
factors increase the advantages of indigenous forces, insurgents, and pro-incumbent IF 
over conventional militaries. This study argues that, along with the previously noted 
temporary incentives rooted in motivation and ideology, there are also largely permanent 
socio-cultural codes that influence a conflict’s dynamics. Despite occasional attempts to 
capture social values under diverse collective definitions,20 the literature on asymmetric 
conflicts thus far contains no references to socio-cultural values. These values, consisting 
of specific socio-cultural codes, such as codes of retaliation, warrior ethos, codes of 
silence, and systemic hospitality are utilised by honorific societies21 as mechanisms of 
violent mobilisation and support structures in conflict environments. This phenomenon is 
                                                 
19 Kimberly Theidon, ‘Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia’, The International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 1 (2007) 66–90. 
20  David L. Buffaloe, ‘Defining Asymmetric Warfare’, The Land Warfare Papers 58/09 
(2006) 22-24. 
21  Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor. The Psychology of Violence in the 
South (Boulder: Westview Press 1996). 
  
highlighted by Alexander’s22 example of Taliban militants in present-day Afghanistan, 
noting that ‘80 percent of Afghan insurgents are fighting close to their homes because of 
grievances felt locally and are not Taliban ideologues.’ As many such militants lack 
political or other ideological motivations, Kilcullen23 has designated such fighters 
motivated by socio-cultural values as ‘accidental guerrillas.’ Widespread and deeply 
rooted in the social structures of many ‘honour cultures’, these socio-cultural codes are 
normally absent in modern ‘industrialised societies.’ In conflict environments, these 
socio-cultural values create a clear-cut disparity between insurgents and the incumbents.  
While scholars have emphasised the importance of socio-cultural codes in conflict 
escalation and transformation in different COIN operations around the world,24 the 
literature has thus far failed to conceptualise and explore this form of asymmetry in 
detail. This section identifies key authors and pieces of empirical research advancing the 
literature on socio-cultural codes. For example, Kilcullen, Miakhel and Dorronsoro, and 
Lobato25 have explored the importance of honour-based retaliation and warrior ethos as 
sources of violent mobilisation, as well as of the code of hospitality in present-day 
                                                 
22  Alexander, “Decomposing” an Insurgency, 50. 
23  David Kilcullen, An Accidental Guerilla. Fighting Small Wars in the midst of a Big One 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009) 
24  Robert M. Cassidy, ‘Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Vietnam and Other Small Wars’, Parameters (2004) 73-83. 
25  Kilcullen, An Accidental Guerilla; Shahmahmood Miakhel, Understanding Afghanistan: 
The Importance of Tribal Culture and Structure in Security and Governance (US Institute of 
Peace 2009); Gilles Dorronsoro and Chantal Lobato, ‘The Militia in Afghanistan’, Central Asian 
Survey 8/4 (1989) 95-108. 
  
Afghanistan. Mohamed has written about honour-centred traditional codes in Somalia, 
while Boehm and Boyle have studied the characteristics of blood revenge and other 
forms of honour-based retaliation in Montenegro and Kosovo.26 A study by Abu-Lughod 
explored the characteristics of revenge-centred violent mobilisation among the Bedoin 
Arab tribes, and Simon27 explored socio-cultural values of tribes in Oceania. Gould and 
Bell have studied the tradition of revenge and the code of silence (omertà) in Italy, and 
Ikegami has researched honorific codes of blood feud in Samurai-era Japan.28 
Souleimanov’s research has shed light on codes of retaliation and hospitality in conflict-
                                                 
26  Jama Mohamed, ‘Kinship and Contract in Somali Politics’, Africa 77/02 (May 2007) 
226-249; Christopher Boehm, Blood Revenge. The Enactment and Management of Conflict in 
Montenegro and other tribal societies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1984); Michael J. 
Boyle, ‘Revenge and reprisal violence in Kosovo’, Conflict, Security & Development 10/2, (2010) 
189-216. 
27  Lila Abu-Lughod, ‘Honor and the Sentiments of Loss in a Bedouin Society’, American 
Ethnologist 12/2 (1985) 245-261; Scott Simon, ‘Politics and Headhunting among the Formosan 
Sejiq: Ethnohistorical Perspectives’, Oceania 82/2 (2012) 164-185. 
28  Roger V. Gould, ‘Revenge as Sanction and Solidarity Display: An Analysis of Vendettas 
in Nineteenth-Century Corsica’, American Sociological Review 65/5 (2000) 682-704; Rudolph 
Bell, Fate, Honor, Family and Village. Demographic and Cultural Change in Rural Italy since 
1800 (Chicago: Chicago University Press 2009); Eiko Ikegami, The Taming of the Samurai: 
Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
1995). 
  
ridden Chechen society in the North Caucasus.29 This voluminous literature on socio-
cultural values as forms of violent mobilisation and support structures demonstrates that, 
within the context of contemporary conflicts, the reliance on socio-cultural codes creates 
an asymmetry between the indigenous ‘honour cultures’ and their opponents from 
‘industrialised’ societies.  
This asymmetric relationship, however, has yet to be applied to research on 
asymmetric conflicts. The role of socio-cultural values in existing scholarship on 
asymmetric conflicts has thus far been addressed by two strands of literature. First, a 
small but growing number of studies on post-heroic warfare have sought to prioritise the 
importance of honour and other honorific values in the formation of ideational and 
motivational incentives for violent mobilisation in contemporary conflicts. According to 
studies by Luttwak and Kober,30 the post-WWII militaries of industrialised nations have 
lost the pre-modern notions of honour, duty, and self-sacrifice, which they have chosen to 
substitute with modern military technology employed to reduce human losses and to 
decrease the costs of military campaigns. This research, however, is centred on military 
traditions rather than on the socio-cultural values of societies impacted by conflicts. 
                                                 
29  Emil Souleimanov, ‘The Caucasus Emirate: Genealogy of an Islamist Insurgency', 
Middle East Policy 18/4 (2011) 55-168. 
30 Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Toward Post-Heroic Warfare’, Foreign Affairs (May/June 1995); 
Avi Kober, ‘From Heroic to Postheroic Warfare: Israel’s Way of War in Asymmetrical 
Conflicts’, Armed Forces & Society 0 (2013) 1-27. 
  
Second, the role of culture and social traditions is prominent in studies on ‘hearts 
and minds’ strategy and other similar population-centric elements of COIN operations.31 
This strand of literature, in spite of its emphasis on the importance of understanding the 
local culture and social traditions for incumbents, remains focused on military strategy 
designed ‘to gain the acquiescence of the local population, and therefore prevent the 
insurgent from gaining popular support.’32 Specific socio-cultural codes are therefore 
seen by proponents of ‘hearts and minds’ strategy as merely parts of indigenous culture 
and not as mechanisms of violent mobilisation of insurgents (retaliation) and support 
structures (codes of silence and hospitality). As the central focus of the ‘hearts and 
minds’ policy is to address ‘popularly held grievances,’33 the main goal is to remedy the 
outcomes of asymmetry of values rather than deal with its causes – the disparity in socio-
cultural values between insurgents and incumbents. In other words, the key challenge for 
‘hearts and minds’ strategists is to change local populations’ ideological motivations.  
In contrast to motivation- and ideology-centred forms of asymmetry, the 
asymmetry of values is a socio-anthropological phenomenon engrained in static, socio-
culturally encoded values that cannot easily change due to political, economic, or even 
religious milieu. These values, embedded within individuals’ socio-cultural attitudes and 
                                                 
31  Robert M. Cassidy, ‘Counterinsurgency and Military Culture: State Regulars versus 
Non-State Irregulars’, Baltic Security & Defence Review 10 (2008) 53-85. 
32  Charles Lister, ‘Cultural Awareness and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan’, E-
International Relations 11 (2011) 2.  
33  Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter, ‘Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? 
The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq’, Journal of Political Economy 119/4 (2011) 766-
819, 771.  
  
behaviours and sustained and reinforced by public opinion, are based on moral obligation 
and honorific duty. For instance, the obligation to retaliate for a personal offence or for 
an offence to one’s family is sacred among the Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan, as is the 
code of hospitality that necessitates protecting guests at any cost.34 In the Pashtun culture, 
as well as among Somali tribes, different ethnic groups of Oceania, North Albanian clans, 
Vainakh clans of the North Caucasus, and other ethnic groups, the failure to avenge is 
unacceptable for an individual and may result in the social exclusion and shaming of an 
entire family or clan. This obligation is passed on over generations and, as described by 
Miakhel, ‘[a] son, grandson, great grandson or a cousin can take his revenge even after 
several generations.’35 Given the strict adherence to these socio-cultural codes, numerous 
individuals participate in conflicts either without having particular political allegiances or 
in spite of them. As demonstrated by Kilcullen, the warrior ethos is deeply engrained in 
the minds of many Afghans, as a result of which indigenous combatants may choose to 
join in skirmishes between the Taliban and foreign troops only for the sake of 
participation.36 Therefore, unlike ideological (political and religious) and practical 
(greed-driven and defensive) motivations, socio-cultural codes are not susceptible to easy 
change, transformation, or disappearance over the course of a conflict.  
Out of the various socio-cultural codes governing the day-to-day lives of 
honorific societies, this study focuses on three in particular. The first of these is the code 
of retaliation, based on a socially engrained, honorific custom of blood revenge, 
                                                 
34  Miakhel, Understanding Afghanistan, 6. 
35  Ibid.  
36  Kilcullen, An Accidental Guerilla, 39-41. 
  
implemented in retribution for physical or moral damage incurred by one’s family or clan 
members. The code of retaliation is a powerful mechanism of violent mobilisation, 
which, according to Nivette, ‘is an essential … tool of social organisation in places with 
weak socioeconomic ties and political structure.’37 Although, as stated by Nivette, the 
code of retaliation is permanently present in the cultural traditions of over 40 different 
societies around the world,38 it is during times of conflict that it transforms into a 
mechanism of violent mobilisation. In particular, acts of indiscriminate violence 
frequently committed during modern conflicts, including but not limited to bombing of 
civilian settlements and mass executions, result in en masse retaliation-driven violent 
mobilisation of individuals.  
The codes of silence and hospitality are two other socio-cultural codes falling 
under the umbrella concept of asymmetry of values. Essential social components, both in 
peacetime and during conflict, these two codes function as effective support structures for 
indigenous combatants mobilised against a foreign occupying force. Intrinsic to many 
honorific societies, the code of silence serves as a mechanism preventing the local 
population from providing any sort of information about locals to an outsider. Equally 
pervasive is the code of hospitality, which dictates that hosts are obliged to shelter and 
protect their guests at any cost. In times of war, the code of hospitality also requires local 
populations to offer shelter and protection to local fighters from the same kinship group, 
clan, or tribe. 
                                                 
37  Amy Nivette, ‘Violence in Non-State Societies. A Review’, British Journal of 
Criminology 51 (2011) 578–598, 586.  
38  Ibid. 585.  
  
To sum up, this paper argues that these three socio-cultural codes embedded in 
broader socio-cultural value systems intrinsic to numerous honorific societies function as 
mechanisms shaping conflict transformation and affecting its outcome. These 
mechanisms, immune to external political or economic incentives offered by incumbents 
as part of ‘hearts and minds’ strategy, continuously supply insurgents with the manpower 
and material support vital to any insurgency. Having presented the role of socio-cultural 
values in establishing an asymmetric relationship between insurgents and 
counterinsurgents, the next task is to provide a theoretical explanation of how this form 
of asymmetry can be undermined by the deployment of IF. 
 
IF in asymmetric conflicts  
From Afghanistan to Somalia, recent Western military interventions have implicitly 
shown that the asymmetry of values between local insurgents and the incumbents from 
postmodern societies is often difficult to overcome. Despite the rich experience of COIN, 
technological superiority, and numerical advantages, stronger incumbents frequently 
suffer defeats at the hands of their poorly trained and less technologically advanced 
indigenous opponents. Studies by Merom and Arreguin-Toft present a vivid description 
of how incumbents fail to succeed in asymmetric conflicts with much weaker enemies.39 
The French failure to put down the nationalist uprising in Algeria (1954–62), Israel’s 
invasion of Lebanon (1982–85), the American invasion of Vietnam (1965–73), and the 
Soviet incursion into Afghanistan (1979–89) are among the most well-known examples 
                                                 
39  Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars; Ivan Arrequin-Toft, ‘How the Weak Win 
Wars. A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict’, International Security 26/1 (2001) 93-128. 
  
of how modern armies have been unable to succeed in conflicts with weaker local 
adversaries.  
In contrast to the existing literature and in line with the aforementioned arguments 
on the asymmetry of values, we argue that the deployment of IF can alert the imbalance 
of values among combatants. The research on the use of IF in asymmetric conflicts is rife 
with examples of both successful and failed deployments of local forces.40 While no 
study has yet specifically investigated the correlation between IF and asymmetric values, 
the literature on the use of IF in asymmetric wars suggests that the deployment of IF is 
far more controversial in conflicts between opponents with disparities in socio-cultural 
values. For instance, the use of local militia units in post-Taliban Afghanistan ‘produced 
unforeseen and largely deleterious outcomes.’41 Similarly dubious outcomes have been 
observed by Dorronsoro and Lobato regarding the use of local Afghan units during the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.42 Due to the marginal role of local forces, the 
deployment of IF against Sunni tribes in Iraq was similarly ineffective. 43 In these cases, 
IF were largely distrusted by the incumbents and were therefore never deployed as the 
main strategic tool of the COIN operation. Gortzak’s analysis of the French-led IF during 
the Algerian campaign reached similar conclusions.44  
                                                 
40  Cassidy, Regular and Irregular. 
41  Aziz A. Hakimi, ‘Getting savages to fight barbarians: counterinsurgency and the 
remaking of Afghanistan’, Central Asian Survey 32/3 (2013) 388-405, 388. 
42  Dorronsoro and Lobato, The Militia in Afghanistan. 
43  Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press 2006). 
44  Gortzak, Using Indigenous Forces. 
  
In contrast, the use of IF on a larger scale in American COIN operations during 
the Philippine-American War and British COIN during the Malayan conflict, as well as 
much earlier deployment of large IF-manned armies during the British colonial wars on 
the Indian subcontinent, have proven more successful.45 For example, as described by 
Cassidy, during the American campaign in Vietnam (1965–73), the US military 
succeeded in raising an army of ‘50,000 tribal fighters to operate in some of the most 
austere terrain.’46 As a result of this mass scale deployment of local forces, which, in 
addition to indigenous fighters also included former Viet Cong guerrillas, the IF ‘worked 
somewhat effectively and offered the additional value of unhinging the enemy morally 
and psychologically.’47 In contrast to the deployment of IF at later stages of the conflict 
in Afghanistan (2003–10), the use of Northern Alliance militias in ousting the Taliban 
over the course of the early phase of the Afghan campaign yielded positive results. In 
Somalia, current attempts to use large numbers of indigenous forces to defeat Al-Shabaab 
militants have thus far proven effective.48 In Chechnya, the deployment of indigenous 
                                                 
45  Timothy K. Deady, Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 
1899-1902 (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College 2005); Corum, Training Indigenous Forces; 
Christopher Herbert, War of No Pity: The Indian mutiny and Victorian Trauma (NJ: Princeton 
University Press 2008).  
46  Cassidy, The Long Small War, 59. 
47  Ibid.  
48  Jeffrey Gettleman, Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, ‘U.S. Relies on Contractors in 
Somalia Conflict’, New York Times August 10 (2011). 
 
  
paramilitaries, as will be demonstrated in this article, contributed to the considerable 
weakening of the local insurgent force.  
The role of asymmetry of values in these conflicts, however, remains unexplored. 
It remains to be seen why, and under what conditions, IF succeed in turning the tide in an 
asymmetric conflict. What is known, however, is that in most of the previously 
mentioned conflicts, honour-based socio-cultural codes deeply engrained in the local 
cultures create an asymmetry of values observable between local combatants and 
incumbent forces. As this study demonstrates, the use of IF is associated with the 
asymmetry of values, and it is through that interplay that local kadyrovtsy units in 
Chechnya have managed to change the imbalance of values between Russian forces and 
Chechen rebels, thereby contributing to the conflict’s transformation in favour of the 
incumbent.   
 
The making of a local ally: Kadyrovtsy and pro-Moscow Chechen authorities 
Despite important differences between the two conflicts, the First (1994–96) and Second 
(1999–ongoing) Chechen wars have an important similarity. Having won the initial, 
rather conventional phase of the war, the Russian army largely failed to achieve a clear-
cut victory in the guerrilla phase that ensued. More than four years into the second round 
of military confrontation and in spite of all its military superiority, the 100,000-strong 
Russian military in Chechnya still faced a committed insurgent force. A force which, 
notwithstanding sufficient blows inflicted upon it, the Russian military proved incapable 
of defeating. Indeed, as late as in 2004, a Russian combat general reported from the 
republic that the federal troops were ‘so busy just trying to ensure their own security’ that 
  
they ‘almost never can counter the resurgent guerrillas,’ a state of affairs that strikingly 
resembled the first war.49 
 The situation began to change dramatically only around 2005. At that time, the 
paramilitary units of Chechnya’s pro-Moscow government, kadyrovtsy – named after 
their commanders Akhmad Kadyrov and his younger son Ramzan – started to be 
increasingly deployed in combat against insurgent units, gradually replacing the Russian 
military as the main COIN force.50 A number of factors contributed to the establishment 
of the pro-Moscow Chechen authorities and, most importantly, to the forming of a 
vicious yet effective indigenous paramilitary force. It is a well-known fact that it was the 
strategic calculation of Vladimir Putin, Russia’s newly elected president and former 
intelligence officer, to break the backbone of the Chechen insurgency from the inside that 
prompted him in 2000 to enlist Akhmad Kadyrov, a former insurgent leader. As Putin 
eloquently put it at the time, ‘his [Kadyrov’s] contacts with the people who are still 
putting up resistance against us in Chechnya […] will be positive.’51 What is less known 
about Kadyrov’s fundamental incentive to join – and eventually lead  – the newly formed 
pro-Moscow authorities and paramilitary force, was the state of blood feud between him 
and his enemies among Chechnya’s jihadists, an increasingly potent force in the Chechen 
                                                 
49  Mark Kramer, ‘The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia’s War in Chechnya’, 
International Security 29/3 (2004) 5-63, 9.  
50  The beginning of the massive deployment of kadyrovtsy paramilitaries in combat dates 
back to 2003.  
51  Ilya Maksakov, ‘Chetyre Putinskikh Goda v Chechne’, Prague Watchdog March 26 
(2004).  
  
insurgency movement that Kadyrov’s clan seemed incapable of resisting.52 From the 
moment the blood feud was initiated, Kadyrov had to seek collaboration with, and the 
backing of, the invading Russian forces in order for him and his relatives to survive. 
Frequently cited ideological considerations, such as Kadyrov’s infamous notoriety among 
Salafis as a devout Sufi – which commentators both in and outside of Russia have often 
referred to as Kadyrov’s sole motive to defect to the Russians – therefore played only a 
secondary role.  
 It was against this background that Kadyrov became the main instrument of 
Moscow’s COIN strategy in Chechnya as he used his authority, knowledge, and contacts 
in the insurgency movement to coerce former insurgents into demobilisation or 
straightforward defection. Two mechanisms proved particularly effective in this regard. 
First, initially with the assistance of the Russian military, insurgents were threatened with 
the targeting of relatives unless they capitulated. Many insurgents submitted to this 
pressure, while those who resisted saw their relatives tortured and murdered.53 
                                                 
52 In May 1999, just a few months before the outbreak of the Second Chechen War, the 
animosity between Kadyrov and his opponents among Chechnya’s jihadists, led by influential 
warlords (Shamil Basayev and emir Khattab) resulted in an unsuccessful assassination attempt on 
Akhmad Kadyrov, which claimed the lives of five of his bodyguards, including three of his 
nephews. This effectively started the blood feud between the warring sides.  
53  The seizure of relatives of Aslan Maskhadov, the leader of Chechnya's insurgency, 
including his two brothers and sisters aged 69–75, is a typical example of this phenomenon. After 
Maskhadov’s refusal to capitulate, some of his relatives, captured by kadyrovtsy and Russian 
secret services, disappeared without a trace (Pravda.ru, ‘V Chechne Pokhischeny Rodstvenniki 
Maskhadova’, Pravda, January 10 (2005)).   
  
Remarkably, the deployment of former insurgents, now members of kadyrovtsy units, in 
insurgent operations helped enhance the incumbent’s knowledge of the insurgents’ social 
background and their modus operandi. As early as in 2000, the Russian military launched 
waves of mop-up operations, infamously known as zachistkas. Encircling entire Chechen 
villages and neighbourhoods, Russian troops deployed indiscriminate violence en masse. 
This included extrajudicial killings, torturing, and injuring Chechen males of conscription 
age on the basis of their alleged participation in insurgent units, as well as terrorising the 
local population at large. In addition, thousands of Chechen males underwent what came 
to be known as forced disappearances. Dozens of mass graves were found across 
Chechnya, containing the bodies of thousands of predominantly young Chechens, most of 
them bearing signs of torture.54 Cases of rape were also reported.55  
 For many young Chechens and their families, the only way to survive was 
through their relatives’ membership in the newly formed pro-Moscow paramilitary units. 
In fact, Irina Gordienko, a Russian liberal journalist who has covered the war from the 
ground, recalls that, ‘it was the membership in kadyrovtsy units alone that ensured 
Chechen males and their families’ safety in the face of violence perpetrated by Russian 
forces and kadyrovtsy paramilitaries.’56 In spite of the dishonour resulting from 
                                                 
54  Jamestown Foundation, Chechnya Weekly 8/21 (May 24 2007); The New York Times, 
‘Russia: Chechen Mass Grave Found’, NYT June 21 (2008).   
55  For a detailed account of the Russian military-led COIN in Chechnya, see, for instance, 
Emma Gilligan, Terror in Chechnya: Russia and the Tragedy of Civilians in War (NJ: Princeton 
University Press 2013).  
56  Online interview with Irina Gordienko, Novaya gazeta, 9 June 2014. 
  
collaboration with the incumbent, thousands of Chechens entered, or were forced to enter 
under death threats for both themselves and their relatives, into kadyrovtsy units. Once 
deployed in combat against insurgents, their relatives, and supporters, new recruits found 
themselves in a no-exit situation, as they were fully engaged in blood feuds with fellow 
Chechens. They therefore had to rely even more on their relatives and fellow kadyrovtsy 
to ensure physical survival for themselves and their relatives – resulting in a point of no 
return.   
Four years later, in 2009, the ‘anti-terrorist operation’ was formally terminated by 
Moscow, with most Russian troops withdrawn from the erstwhile breakaway republic. 
Since then, Chechnya has been among the most secure areas of the North Caucasus, with 
insurgent activity gradually declining. As of 2013, only 39 deaths and 62 injuries were 
reported as a result of insurgent activity – a tiny fraction of the insurgency-related 
casualties that had plagued Chechnya in previous years.57 In comparison, that same year, 
the neighbouring republic of Dagestan had 341 deaths and 305 injuries reported as a 
result of insurgency-related activity.58 The seismic shift in insurgent activity has been so 
significant that, since the late 2000s, Chechnya has been replaced by Dagestan, and 
episodically also by certain other North Caucasian republics, as the hotbed of insurgent 
violence. The subsequent chapters outline the particular mechanisms that enabled the 
incumbent to gradually stem the tide of a once-formidable insurgency in Chechnya.  
 
                                                 
57  Kavkaz Uzel, January 28 (2014), retrieved from: http://www.kavkaz-
uzel.ru/articles/237203/.  
58  Ibid., retrieved from: http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/237341/.  
  
Retaliation  
Together with the code of retaliation, Chechnya’s clan-based society has historically 
facilitated effective mobilisation of clan members to defend their individual honour, as 
well as that of their kin and clan as a whole. The very concept of blood feud is deeply 
engrained in Chechnya’s clan system, to the extent that retaliation is directed not only at 
the direct culprit of an offence, but also at his patrilineal male relatives, which has been 
justified on the grounds of an individuals close ties with his clan-defined relatives. 
Failure to retaliate, regardless of the circumstances surrounding such decision, result in 
the offended individual’s considerable decline in social status. Notably, this is not 
confined to individuals, but rather encompasses their entire clan, and results in their 
public labelling as weaklings and cowards incapable of defending their honour. 
Ostracism and opprobrium have resulted not only from cases of non-retaliation, but also 
from an individual’s failure to follow the local code of honour encompassing, among 
other things, the codes of hospitality and silence.59  
Over the course of the First Chechen War, the profound need to retaliate against 
the wrongs inflicted upon individuals and their relatives became a key incentive to 
mobilise. A number of accounts testify to the (initially) apolitical motivation of thousands 
of ordinary Chechens to go to war just weeks and months following the Russian incursion 
                                                 
59  For a more detailed overview of Chechen ethnography, see Amjad Jaimoukha, The 
Chechens. A Handbook (NY: Routledge 2005); Emil Souleimanov, An Endless War: The 
Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective (Peter Lang 2007) 19-42. 
  
into their homeland.60 Remarkably, a significant number of Chechens had previously 
been sceptical of Chechnya’s separatist leadership, wishing instead to avoid the mounting 
hostilities. The excessive use of indiscriminate violence exerted by Russian troops, 
however, quickly alienated many Chechens, urging them to take up arms in order to 
restore what they considered to be their (and their relatives’) violated honour and dignity. 
According to an interview with a former insurgent,  
 
In the beginning, no one was really willing to go to war... After all, we all 
had families, households, elderly parents to care for. But when your younger 
brother is killed in an air strike, what are you supposed to do? To stay home 
and watch TV? For us as Chechens, there was no other way left but to take 
up arms and seek revenge.61  
 
                                                 
60  James Hughes, ‘The Chechnya Conflict: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?’, 
Demokratizatsiya 15/3 (2007) 293-311; Souleimanov, An Endless War; Michael McCullough, 
Beyond Revenge: The Evolution of the Forgiveness Instinct (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 2008) 
35-38; Jean-François Ratelle, Radical Islam and the Chechen War Spillover: A Political 
Ethnographic Reassessment of the Upsurge of Violence in the North Caucasus since 2009 
(University of Ottawa 2013) 157-164. 
61  Interview with ‘Idris’, 43, London, November 2011.  
  
As reinforced by numerous interviews, the need to retaliate was dictated by the local 
socio-cultural code of honour as an immense moral obligation devoid of ideological, 
political, or social connotations.62  
 The custom of blood feud has historically been implemented in a highly selective 
way, as an offended individual or their relatives sought retaliation against a group of 
males associated with the perpetrator by means of kinship. The anonymity inherent in 
armed conflict and the offended individual's inability to identify the direct culprit or his 
relatives from among Russian troops has therefore widened the circle of potential culprits 
to encompass the entire Russian armed forces. This altered the traditional rules of blood 
feud and legitimised retaliation against randomly selected Russian combatants. As a 
consequence, attacks on Russians as an ethnic community also became legitimised as the 
imaginary border between combatants and Russian society as a whole became 
increasingly blurred. An individual’s inability to identify the direct perpetrator of an 
offence often prompted them to remain in an insurgent group after retaliation was carried 
out, thereby contributing to the gradual merger of personal and ideological (nationalistic, 
political, and religious) motivations.63   
 The code of retaliation has thus been an effective trigger for mobilisation, 
ensuring a constant inflow of new recruits into the insurgency. Importantly, the structure 
of Chechnya’s clan system has had a snowball effect on individual retaliation, leading 
                                                 
62  Interviews with Chechens, eyewitnesses of the First and Second Chechen wars, in 
Moscow (September 2009), Paris (August 2011), London (November 2011), and Istanbul 
(September 2012).  
63 Ibid.  
  
several males to mobilise in order to retaliate against the wrongs and losses suffered by 
their families and clan members. It is fair to say that Russian troops’ indiscriminate 
targeting of thousands of Chechens has at various stages of military confrontation 
mobilised an insurgency of thousands of inflicted individuals’ relatives, with the murder 
and particularly rape of one Chechen triggering the mobilisation of an average of three to 
five male relatives. Remarkably, this mechanism has worked irrespective of an 
individual’s previous political preferences, as many of them reportedly held either anti-
regime or even anti-separatist views, or distanced themselves from politics entirely. The 
need to retaliate, as dictated by the local socio-cultural codes and necessitated by public 
opinion, worked as an apolitical but effective mechanism ensuring mobilisation into the 
insurgency. 
 The gradual deployment of thousands of kadyrovtsy in COIN operations from the 
early 2000s onward has shaken the foundations of Chechen society. Freshly recruited 
members of the pro-Moscow Chechen paramilitaries, including both former insurgents 
and Chechen males without previous insurgent experience, have been widely deployed 
not only in combat against insurgents, but have also been deployed in retributive 
campaigns against the relatives of actual or alleged insurgents as well as against their 
supporters –a move aiming to cement the loyalty and devotion of fresh recruits to the pro-
Moscow camp.64 As a result of the local tradition of blood feud, thousands of ordinary 
Chechens – relatives of kadyrovtsy and pro-Moscow authorities – have found themselves 
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See also Emil Souleimanov, ‘Russian Chechnya Policy: “Chechenisation” turning into 
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in the midst of blood feud with insurgents and their family members.65 Since the early 
2000s, this has compelled them to join kadyrovtsy units, establish self-defence units in 
their native villages to repel insurgent attacks, or assist kadyrovtsy paramilitaries in local 
COIN operations. As may be expected, pro-Moscow Chechens’ superior knowledge of 
their fellow Chechens has reduced the number of those Chechens willing to join the 
insurgency movement, which would inevitably put their relatives’ lives at immense risk.  
 A key factor behind recruitment into kadyrovtsy and village self-defence units has 
been the commitment of kadyrovtsy’s relatives to retaliate against the insurgents and their 
relatives. According to an interviewee,  
 
Those Chechens whose relatives found themselves trapped in kadyrovtsy units 
[…] It was quite natural that they had to defend themselves, to defend their 
honour. Even if they had sympathised with the fighters [boeviki], they still had 
to do what they ought to do as Chechens.66  
 
This statement emphasises yet again that honour and survival have been stronger motives 
for violent engagement than political preferences or a desire to avoid the hostilities. As 
previously mentioned, for those Chechens seeking to retaliate against Russian troops 
during the First Chechen War as well as during the initial years of the Second Chechen 
War, the target of retaliation became blurred to encompass the entire Russian armed 
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forces. Since the deployment of kadyrovtsy in the COIN operation, the situation has 
reversed considerably. While kadyrovtsy have often sought to mask their identities during 
forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture, and rape, individuals seeking 
retaliation have usually managed to reveal the culprits' identities. In this regard, Mairbek 
Vatchagaev, a Chechen historian and political scientist, eloquently terms Chechnya – an 
autonomous republic of slightly more than one million predominantly rural inhabitants – 
—a ‘big village’, where people know each other and readily find out about others’ 
activities.67 Indeed, an individual’s membership in a kadyrovtsy unit or deployment in an 
operation in a particular area has rarely gone unnoticed. As a result, revenge seekers from 
both sides find it easier to identify and target either the direct perpetrator of an offence or 
his relatives. The republic therefore quickly entered a vicious state of civil war, with 
blood feuds tearing apart various Chechen clans.   
 As in the case of insurgent mobilisation in the First Chechen War, many 
Chechens (relatives of kadyrovtsy paramilitaries) have joined the ranks of pro-Moscow 
authorities and forces irrespective of their (initial) political preferences or even in spite of 
them. As explained by many interviewees, these individuals’ motivation to side with the 
pro-Moscow Chechen camp has often been devoid of any ideological connotations since, 
as noted by Tomáš Šmíd, ‘in these situations, the clan principle is still intact. Since I am 
one of “us” [kadyrovtsy], I stick to “us.”’68 Individual motivation has been dictated rather 
by more pragmatic considerations than by ideology, whereby individuals seek to attack 
                                                 
67  Online interview with Mairbek Vatchagaev, 28 May, 2014.  
68  Online interview with Tomáš Šmíd, an expert on the North Caucasus at Masaryk 
University, 9 June 2014.  
  
the enemy side before it can attack theirs. The code of retaliation has thus ensured 
constant inflow of recruits into kadyrovtsy paramilitaries in particular and pro-Moscow 
Chechen armed units in general. With the Russian armed forces’ backing on the ground, 
the (formally) pro-Moscow camp soon gained the upper hand in the conflict, gradually 
undermining the social base of the insurgency movement.  
 
Code of silence  
The code of silence is deeply rooted in Chechen society, constituting an important 
component of the local concept of honour. Due to the Chechens’ lack of an independent 
state, centuries of governance and oppression by foreign rulers, the resulting local 
resistance, and the introverted nature of Chechen clans, local social cultural codes have 
required clan members to not only avoid any form of collaboration with authorities, but 
they have also dictated that clans and families avoid disseminating information about 
their internal issues to outsiders, especially when sensitive information is at stake. Failure 
to comply with the code of silence leads to ostracism, resulting in a dramatic decrease in 
individual and collective honour.  
 In keeping with the code of silence, Chechens largely refused to provide internal 
information to the Russian military and secret services during the First Chechen War, 
including information on the identities of insurgents, their supporters, and relatives. In 
contrast to a number of other (counter)insurgencies elsewhere in the world where locals 
have often been eager to supply incumbents with information on the insurgents and their 
social networks in an attempt to obtain benefits, the Chechens stubbornly resisted 
dragging outsiders into what they considered to be their own internal issues. As one 
  
interviewee observed, ‘on many occasions, the Russian officers approached us offering 
various things... Money, cattle, security […] in exchange for information about the 
fighters. Naturally, we refused, because it’s not a Chechen habit to rat on your people.’69 
According to various sources, this has held true even against the background of enormous 
pressure exerted by authorities on the locals.70 Notwithstanding (the threat of) torture, 
murder, and injury, the overwhelming majority of Chechens chose not to collaborate with 
the occupiers, a fact that has also been confirmed by Russian sources.71 In fact, only a 
small number of Chechens – mostly the so-called Moscow Chechens, or former 
communist nomenklatura, located in the republic’s Russified northern lowlands – chose 
to collaborate with the Russian authorities, thereby breaking the local code of honour. 
Importantly, most interviewees have pointed to the incompatibility between collaboration 
with Russian forces and the local honour-based code of silence, the opprobrium that may 
result from such collaboration, and the fear of physical harm at the hands of insurgents as 
the main impediments to collaborating with authorities.72  
  As a result of failing to penetrate Chechnya’s social fabric, the Russian military 
and secret services found themselves incapable of obtaining highly personalised 
information from the ground. During the First Chechen War, this effectively prohibited 
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the use of selective violence by the incumbent—a crucial determinant of success in 
COIN. The Russian military therefore had to rely even more on the use of rather 
counterproductive indiscriminate violence, thereby helping to fuel the insurgency with 
thousands of new recruits. At the same time, confidence in the local population’s loyalty 
and non-collaboration with the incumbent forces enabled insurgents to move relatively 
freely across Chechnya and to carry out covert attacks against Russian troops without the 
fear of detection or betrayal.  
 The deployment of kadyrovtsy in combat as well as the increasing number of 
supporters from among their civilian relatives has had serious implications for how the 
code of silence has been applied in the Second Chechen War. Engulfed in blood feuds 
with insurgents and their relatives, the relatives of kadyrovtsy have found themselves at 
the epicentre of a merciless civil war, a war in which their very physical survival and 
honour have been contingent upon the pro-Moscow camp’s success in COIN operations. 
Relatives of kadyrovtsy and Chechen authorities alike have begun to provide information 
about insurgents, their relatives, and supporters inasmuch as this type of information has 
ceased to be a Chechen internal affair. As noted by an interviewee, ‘all of a sudden, 
ordinary Chechens started ratting on their blood enemies as they became personally 
involved in the war.’73 Indeed, in Chechnya’s small mountainous villages – the traditional 
stronghold of the insurgency – an individual’s activities are not easily hidden from the 
rest of the community. Easily detected against the backdrop of isolated mountain 
communities, a fellow villager’s contact with or provision of support to insurgents ‘have 
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now been routinely reported by the relatives of pro-Moscow Chechens.’74 The 
disappearance of a Chechen male from his village usually evokes suspicion amongst 
fellow villagers from the pro-Moscow camp, who in turn inform pro-Moscow Chechen 
authorities of any such activity. This has resulted in retributive assaults on insurgents’ 
(alleged) supporters or families perpetrated by kadyrovtsy and their local backers, 
sparking bloody confrontation among the warring camps within particular communities. 
Due to the numerical superiority of kadyrovtsy and their backing by Russian troops, these 
confrontations have usually ended in the defeat of pro-insurgent individuals and clans, 
resulting in the murder or disappearance of the males (and sometimes even females) of 
entire families and clans.75  
 As testified by numerous interviewees, Chechens largely maintained the code of 
silence at the beginning of the de facto Chechen civil war. Rather than provide 
information directly to either federal or Chechen pro-Moscow authorities, many 
Chechens, particularly from the more conservative rural areas, sought to contact pro-
Moscow Chechen relatives in order to ensure that outsiders were not dragged into what 
they considered to be their internal affairs.76 
 Over time, the once-omnipresent code of silence has been partially broken, 
providing pro-Moscow Chechen authorities and law enforcement agencies with access to 
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highly personalised information from Chechen communities. Armed with local 
knowledge of the insurgents’ social base, selective violence perpetrated by kadyrovtsy 
has become widespread. This, in turn, has enabled incumbent forces to target only 
insurgents, their supporters, and relatives, while avoiding uninvolved individuals. This 
has helped to avoid the alienation of masses of uninvolved Chechens – a previous 
consequence of the largely indiscriminate use of violence by Russian troops in both wars. 
 
Code of hospitality  
An integral part of the local code of honour, hospitality has historically been treated as 
sacred in Chechen society. Such is the extent of the role of hospitality in Chechen culture 
that it has been prioritised even above retaliation. According to local customary law, a 
host is expected to provide even his blood enemy with not only absolute safety, but also 
shelter and protection from external threats. While strict adherence to customary law has 
faded somewhat in recent decades, the hospitality-based obligation to provide fellow 
Chechens, fighters, and all those in need, with any necessary accommodation and 
material support persists in Chechen society.   
 During the First Chechen War, insurgents were routinely provided with a broad 
spectrum of material support by the local population, including food, shelter, warm 
clothing, medicine, weapons, and ammunition. They would also often provide insurgents 
with information on the movements and activities of Russian troops stationed nearby.77 
Interviewees have asserted that their support was clearly mandated by the local code of 
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hospitality, and was given in spite of the threat of discovery and penalisation by Russian 
troops. One interviewee has testified to this, observing that, ‘nokhchalla78 required that 
we not only embraced them [insurgents], but that we also provided them with any 
necessary support since they were Chechens, Muslims, as we were […].’79 The adat-
based support for insurgents was so strong that, in some instances, locals pretended to 
have provided hospitality to insurgents, such that ‘a Chechen who did not aid fighters 
[boeviki] would lie that he had hosted a group of fighters in the night […].’80 Against this 
background, the uniform applicability of the code of silence in Chechen society reduced 
the risk that an individual practicing the code would be revealed as having provided 
support to insurgents during the First Chechen War.  
 The implementation of the code of hospitality shaped the social base of the 
Chechen insurgency to a large extent during the First Chechen War. As an insurgency 
rises and falls on the tide of popular support, the locals’ commitment to providing 
tangible support to insurgents, dictated by the code of hospitality, enhanced the Chechen 
insurgents’ social mobility in that food, shelter, medicine, and other forms of support 
were provided to them by the local population in various parts of the republic. This 
occurred in spite of serious risks for those involved in pro-insurgent activities.  
 During the Second Chechen War, the incumbent’s access to internal information 
on the ground and its ability to target individuals selectively has undermined the once-
uniform applicability of the code of hospitality in Chechen society. Although many 
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Chechens, bound by these socio-cultural codes, have still continued to provide support to 
the insurgents, the understanding of the high costs of pro-insurgent activity has prompted 
many Chechens to disassociate themselves from the insurgency – even at the cost of 
violating the local code of hospitality. ‘The danger is just too high now,’ admits an 
interviewee, pointing to the fact that while ‘hiding that you aided insurgents in the First 
[Chechen] War was an easier task’ due to the archaic code of silence practiced uniformly 
among the Chechens, ‘nowadays [during the Second Chechen War], there would always 
be some collaborators in the village that would readily denounce it.’81 Similarly, 
Vatchagaev notes that the current system of oppression and retribution imposed by 
kadyrovtsy has shaken the traditional Chechen codes of, inter alia, hospitality, noting, ‘it 
is not that people refusing support to fighters refuse a life in a free society [devoid of 
occupation], but that they are afraid of being killed.’82 
 Still, even against the backdrop of enormous penalisation, the code of silence has 
not vanished entirely. Those who in spite of the risks have still continued to provide 
support to insurgents dramatically reduced the scope of their support, confining it to food, 
medicine, and warm clothing. Insurgents have typically sought to stay away from villages 
where they have had supporters in order to either avoid jeopardising the lives of their 
supporters (and thus lose their support base), or to avoid being captured. Without the 
shelter and basic medical treatment previously provided to them in towns and villages, 
insurgents have been forced to spend cold winters up in their mountainous hideouts, 
frequently moving from place to place. This has understandably significantly weakened 
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their physical and psychological state and has also caused their numbers to decrease due 
to the shortage of supplies. Unable to uniformly rely on the code of hospitality, the 
insurgents' ability to move freely across the republic has also been greatly restricted. The 
polarisation of Chechen society and the emergence of a highly motivated anti-insurgent 
camp have likewise led to the momentous fragmentation of popular support to the 
insurgents. Therefore, Chechen insurgency has weakened considerably.  
 
Conclusion  
This article has examined how the deployment of indigenous forces by incumbents can 
reverse the course of asymmetric conflict, reversing the initial imbalance of socio-cultural 
values enjoyed by insurgents and thus transforming the conflict dynamics in favour of the 
incumbent. While the importance of IF in counterinsurgencies has been reiterated in 
numerous studies, there has been little understanding of the specific mechanisms on the 
ground allowing IF to contribute to a successful COIN. In order to address this lack of 
certainty, this article conducted a comprehensive empirical examination of the role of 
socio-cultural codes in COIN. It particularly examined the code of retaliation as a 
mechanism of violent mobilisation and the codes of silence and hospitality as insurgent 
support structures during the First and Second Chechen wars.  
 This study has also demonstrated that the successful deployment of kadyrovtsy 
paramilitaries by the incumbent during the second Chechen campaign allowed 
counterinsurgents to negate the advantages enjoyed by insurgents relying on socio-
cultural codes during the First Chechen War. Our findings indicate that it is only after the 
deployment of IF that incumbents have taken advantage of the mechanism of violent 
  
mobilisation among the local population dictated by the socio-cultural obligation to 
retaliate against the insurgents, and that this deployment of IF has significantly reduced 
the insurgents’ chances of relying on popular support maintained under the codes of 
silence and hospitality. As any insurgency is vitally dependent on local support, the use 
of pro-incumbent IF has left the Chechen insurgency weakened, distanced from the local 
population and, as a result, devoid of uniform popular support. This proves that the 
deployment of IF that are both effective and loyal to the incumbent may change the 
imbalance of socio-cultural values that otherwise work to the insurgents’ advantage in 
favour of the incumbent.  
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